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	<title>Comments on: Dennett&#8217;s Sweet Dreams - consciousness and the Turing test</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.alandix.com/blog/2006/12/30/dennetts-sweet-dreams-consciousness-and-the-turing-test/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.alandix.com/blog/2006/12/30/dennetts-sweet-dreams-consciousness-and-the-turing-test/</link>
	<description>just starting ...</description>
	<pubDate>Tue,  6 Jan 2009 10:52:07 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: alan</title>
		<link>http://www.alandix.com/blog/2006/12/30/dennetts-sweet-dreams-consciousness-and-the-turing-test/#comment-6565</link>
		<dc:creator>alan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 30 Dec 2007 12:44:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Had a quick peek at your paper huoyangao (actually a bit confused as the website is just your paper??)  - I agree entirely with your point that model of mind may be a better model of intelligence than straight answers.  Of course, answering simple questions does that also as if I asked you a question you would interpret the question in terms of what you infer I want to know not necessarily the literal words I say.  However, this is perhaps least well exercise in the standard Touring Test as the subtler aspects of language and modelling of intention take place when we are in the real world ... "it's cold in here" means "shut the door".

Actually (and one day will get round to posting about it), it seems likely that self-consciousness (as in consciousness of self not shyness) may be an accident of the need to understand the intentions of others ...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Had a quick peek at your paper huoyangao (actually a bit confused as the website is just your paper??)  - I agree entirely with your point that model of mind may be a better model of intelligence than straight answers.  Of course, answering simple questions does that also as if I asked you a question you would interpret the question in terms of what you infer I want to know not necessarily the literal words I say.  However, this is perhaps least well exercise in the standard Touring Test as the subtler aspects of language and modelling of intention take place when we are in the real world &#8230; &#8220;it&#8217;s cold in here&#8221; means &#8220;shut the door&#8221;.</p>
<p>Actually (and one day will get round to posting about it), it seems likely that self-consciousness (as in consciousness of self not shyness) may be an accident of the need to understand the intentions of others &#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: huoyangao</title>
		<link>http://www.alandix.com/blog/2006/12/30/dennetts-sweet-dreams-consciousness-and-the-turing-test/#comment-6556</link>
		<dc:creator>huoyangao</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 30 Dec 2007 02:20:54 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.alandix.com/blog/?p=5#comment-6556</guid>
		<description>...
In Turing Test Two, two players A and B are again being questioned by a human interrogator C. Before A gave out his answer (labeled as aa) to a question, he would also be required to guess how the other player B will answer the same question and this guess is labeled as ab. Similarly B will give her answer (labeled as bb) and her guess of A's answer, ba. The answers aa and ba will be grouped together as group a and similarly bb and ab will be grouped together as group b. The interrogator will be given first the answers as two separate groups and with only the group label (a and b) and without the individual labels (aa, ab, ba and bb). If C cannot tell correctly which of the aa and ba is from player A and which is from player B, B will get a score of one. If C cannot tell which of the bb and ab is from player B and which is from player A, A will get a score of one. All answers (with the individual labels) are then made available to all parties (A, B and C) and then the game continues. At the end of the game, the player who scored more is considered had won the game and is more "intelligent".
...

&lt;a href='http://turing-test-two.com/ttt/TTT.pdf' rel="nofollow"&gt;
http://turing-test-two.com/ttt/TTT.pdf&lt;/A&gt;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&#8230;<br />
In Turing Test Two, two players A and B are again being questioned by a human interrogator C. Before A gave out his answer (labeled as aa) to a question, he would also be required to guess how the other player B will answer the same question and this guess is labeled as ab. Similarly B will give her answer (labeled as bb) and her guess of A&#8217;s answer, ba. The answers aa and ba will be grouped together as group a and similarly bb and ab will be grouped together as group b. The interrogator will be given first the answers as two separate groups and with only the group label (a and b) and without the individual labels (aa, ab, ba and bb). If C cannot tell correctly which of the aa and ba is from player A and which is from player B, B will get a score of one. If C cannot tell which of the bb and ab is from player B and which is from player A, A will get a score of one. All answers (with the individual labels) are then made available to all parties (A, B and C) and then the game continues. At the end of the game, the player who scored more is considered had won the game and is more &#8220;intelligent&#8221;.<br />
&#8230;</p>
<p><a href='http://turing-test-two.com/ttt/TTT.pdf' rel="nofollow"><br />
</a><a href="http://turing-test-two.com/ttt/TTT.pdf" rel="nofollow">http://turing-test-two.com/ttt/TTT.pdf</a></p>
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		<title>By: alan</title>
		<link>http://www.alandix.com/blog/2006/12/30/dennetts-sweet-dreams-consciousness-and-the-turing-test/#comment-6</link>
		<dc:creator>alan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Jan 2007 21:04:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.alandix.com/blog/?p=5#comment-6</guid>
		<description>You're right Robin got my mary's and zombies mixed up!</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You&#8217;re right Robin got my mary&#8217;s and zombies mixed up!</p>
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		<title>By: Robin Faichney</title>
		<link>http://www.alandix.com/blog/2006/12/30/dennetts-sweet-dreams-consciousness-and-the-turing-test/#comment-5</link>
		<dc:creator>Robin Faichney</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 04 Jan 2007 18:51:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.alandix.com/blog/?p=5#comment-5</guid>
		<description>Zombies are not often called Mary. Dennett is bringing together two traditional scenarios here. Mary is usually a colour-blind scientist who knows all there is to know about the science of colour vision. The question then is, if her colour-blindness was somehow cured, when she first saw a colour would she learn something she didn't know before? I tend to say yes, but it depends what you mean by "learn" and "know". She'd certainly have an experience she'd never had before, and that's not of no significance.

But I'm in vague sort-of agreement with most of the views expressed here, particularly the point about machines that are designed to appear conscious, which I used myself in a blog post just yesterday, entitled Conversing Computers: http://www.robinfaichney.org/?p=13</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Zombies are not often called Mary. Dennett is bringing together two traditional scenarios here. Mary is usually a colour-blind scientist who knows all there is to know about the science of colour vision. The question then is, if her colour-blindness was somehow cured, when she first saw a colour would she learn something she didn&#8217;t know before? I tend to say yes, but it depends what you mean by &#8220;learn&#8221; and &#8220;know&#8221;. She&#8217;d certainly have an experience she&#8217;d never had before, and that&#8217;s not of no significance.</p>
<p>But I&#8217;m in vague sort-of agreement with most of the views expressed here, particularly the point about machines that are designed to appear conscious, which I used myself in a blog post just yesterday, entitled Conversing Computers: <a href="http://www.robinfaichney.org/?p=13" rel="nofollow">http://www.robinfaichney.org/?p=13</a></p>
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